***TJ, sections 73-79***

1. *The Features of the Moral Sentiments*
   1. what are the differences among sentiments, attitudes and “moral feelings” or “moral emotions”?
   2. what distinguishes moral feelings from natural attitudes?
   3. What does Rawls mean by saying, on p. 424, that “All by themselves, a morality of shame or guilt is just part of a moral view”? Why is this important? (HINT: see the bottom of p. 225)
2. *The Connection between the Moral and the Natural Attitudes*
   1. Explain the difference between the two questions Rawls says are involved in examining the relationship between moral and natural attitudes. Why does Rawls take up the first but not the second?

* 1. Walk through the argument in the only full paragraph on p. 427, explaining the important conclusion expressed in the last sentence of the first paragraph on p. 428. Do you agree with the argument? Does it follow from the conclusion that having a sense of justice is a good thing? Is this judgment made within the full or the thin theory of goodness?

1. *The Principles of Moral Psychology*
   1. Note Rawls’s remark on p. 430 “the theory of moral learning depends upon an account of the nature of morality and its various forms”; also the last sentence of §75 on p. 434. Some of you have studied psychology and, perhaps, moral development. Is the subject of psychology taught as if Rawls is right?
   2. What does Rawls mean by the phrase “final end” on p. 432? Explain the sentence on p. 432 beginning “The three psychological laws …”. Do we have many final ends or do we just have one which dominates all others – such as happiness or pleasure? Should we have just one, such as the desire to please God?
   3. It is sometimes said that people are naturally selfish or self-seeking. Is Rawls’s claim that the tendency to to reciprocity is “a deep psychological fact” compatible with this claim? Explain. Is Rawls right?
2. *The Problem of Relative Stability*
   1. An interesting observation: A Nash equilibrium – named for John Nash of *A Beautiful Mind* – occurs in a game when each player’s strategy is her best reply to the strategies played by all the others. Now note that Rawls says on p. 435 that “Just arrangements may not be in equilibrium then because acting fairly is not in general each man’s best reply to the just conduct of his associates.” Rawls’s use of the phrase “best reply” suggests that what makes a well-ordered society stable is that it is in a state of Nash equilibrium.

* 1. Explain the contrast with Hobbes’s view drawn in the last full paragraph on p. 435. (See Appendix)
  2. How does the reciprocal character of justice as fairness contribute to its relatively greater stability (i.e. relative to the stability of a society regulated by the principle of utility)? Explain the contrast on pp. 436-7.


1. *The Basis of Equality*
   1. What two features are does Rawls say are definitive or characteristic of moral personality? Is he right? As we’ve seen, Rawls says that the OP represents us as moral persons. (See, for example, pp. 17, 104) How are the features of moral personality represented in the OP?
   2. what is a range property?
   3. If moral personality is the basis of equality, what are we to say about those who lack it: children, the insane, the permanently handicapped? are these different cases, or are all to be treated in the same way philosophically? In this connection, consider Rawls’s remark on p. 448: “it does seem that we are not required to give strict justice anyway to creatures lacking [the capacity for a sense of justice]”.

***Appendix: TJ, section 76 (remarks about Hobbes)***

***I. Prisoner’s Dilemma***

1. Suppose two thugs, Ted and Fred, meet up on Craig’s List and decide to pull a heist. Before the job, they make a pact of omerta to remain silent if apprehended. After the job, they are apprehended and separated. Each is told of the following conditions:

* “If both of you confess to the heist, you’ll each get 6 year in jail.”
* “If you rat out your partner and he honors your pact, he’ll get 10 years and you go free.”
* “If you two both remain silent, you’ll get 2 years each for trespassing.”
  1. Their pay-off table looks like this:



* 1. Questions:
     + 1. What is it rational for each prisoner to do under the circumstances?
       2. Recall that a Nash equilibrium is a strategy combination in which each player’s strategy is her “best reply” to the strategies of the other players.
          1. How many Nash equilibria are there in this game?
          2. What is it/are they?
       3. Does anyone have any incentive to deviate from the equilibrium?
       4. Is the strategy combination stable? What about the bargain – i.e. the social contract -- struck before the heist?

***II. The Hobbesian Solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma***

1. Now suppose that Ted and Fred work for the notorious mob boss Tommy “the Leviathan” Hobbes, whose tentacles reach into every nook and crevice of society. Suppose further that Tommy has threatened to kill anyone who confesses. Finally suppose that Ted and Fred attach a value of - ∞ to death, and that each knows the other attaches that value to it.
   * + 1. What will their pay-off table look like then? (Suppose 0 and 6 🡪 - ∞)
       2. What will they do?
       3. What is the Nash equilibrium of the new game?
       4. Does anyone have any incentive to deviate from that equilibrium?
       5. Is the strategy combination – and hence the pact or social contract of silence -- stable?
       6. Now explain Rawls’s remark on p. 435: “One may think of a Hobbesian sovereign as a mechanism added to a system of cooperation which would be unstable without it.”
       7. Is the contract stabilized by Tommy the Leviathan “inherently stable” (p. 436)? Why or why not?

***III. Another Solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma***

1. Now suppose that the two thugs are not strangers who met on Craig’s List, but are instead two lovers – Bonnie and Clyde – who also made the vow, who have been committed to one another for a long time, who do not want to be separated and who want to be the kind of people who honor their vows to each other, and that each knows these things about the other. Finally, suppose that each attaches a payoff of - ∞ to being apart and to betraying their love.
   1. Questions
      * 1. What will their pay-off table look like? (Again 0 and 6 🡪 - ∞)
        2. What will they do?
        3. What is the Nash equilibrium of the new game?
        4. Does either Bonnie or Clyde have any incentive to deviate from that equilibrium?
        5. Is the strategy combination – and hence the pact of silence – stable?
   2. Note the following:
      * 1. In the case of Fred and Ted, neither knows that the other has a sense of duty which leads him to keep pledge.
        2. Each knows that the other has a conception of the good according to which it is rational to defect.
        3. Tommy “the Leviathan” is added to unstable system to stabilize it.
        4. In the case of Bonnie and Clyde, neither (1) nor (2) is true so we don’t need a device like (3).
   3. Bonnie and Clyde’s pay-off tables show the relevant parts of their conception of the good.
      * 1. Is their good given by the full or the thin theory?
        2. Now suppose we just consider what their good is according to the thin theory. Could we still find a Nash equilibrium?